'-,....,-,Josophical controversy about the mind has flourished in the thin air of our ignorance about the brain. The humble toad, it now seems, may provide our first instance of a creature whose whole brain is within the reach of our scientific understanding. What will happen to the traditional philosophical issues as our theoretical and factual ignorance recedes? Discussion of the issues explored in the target article is, as Ewert 'says, "often too tii.eoretical, sometimes philosophical and even [as ifthatweren't bad enough?] emotion-laden." The research reported by Ewert has interesting philosophical implications, a5 he probably recognizes, but he wisely leaves the philosophy to the philosophers. Being one, I would like to draw some of the conclusions he eschews. · · First, just to keep enthusiasm in check, we should remind ourselves that although toads are "smart" enough, or "psychological" enough -unlike Aplysia, for instance -to raise (at least for discussion, prior to dismissal) the fascinating questions, they are still remarkably stupid, and the research program depends critically on their stupidity. Insofar as the experimental results are unequivocal, it is thanks to the limits of plasticity and discrimination that have been uncovered. Toads, we learn, are born with hard-wired prey-capture routines with only modest degrees of plasticity. They will go on striking at dummy targets indefinitely, and their standards for prey recognition, though -seiviceable in their niches, are gratifyingly crude. Imagine how we would react to the discovery th~t some human beings were so oblivious that we could substitute cardboard silhouettes on wheels for real people in their environment without seriously disrupting their behavior. "Social" psychology would be a lot easier using these people as subjects, but we would no doubt · ·ve the same feeling with re gard to them that we now have -·'-.._,.. mks to the researches of Ewert and his colleagues -with regard to toads: When you look closely, you find that there's . nobodyhome. -·-·· ;. -·. · ·· -~:~£:~~--~i · : ..:·:.(':!.L:··-· I take it that most readers, after digesting the details of the target article, are ready to relinquish whatever remaining con-. i victions they may have had that _residing behind _ the toad's _ bulging ~yes, watching and waitin~ and deciding when to strike, 1 was a middletoad, a conscious self, the something that must be there if it is to be like something to be a toad (Nagel 1974) . Why? What is it about Ewert's model, and (more important) its supporting research, that promotes this opinion of the toad as a "mere" automaton, a zombie in spite of its biological commonality with us? ·.
, ··· -~ Dualists may be tempted to say that the mere fact that Ewert can explain the toad's behavior without ever adverting to any transactions between the toad's brain and some nonphysical mind would be sufficient (if confirmed) to establish that toads are mere automata, however "clever" they appear to the uninitiated. The objections to this view do not need rehearsing here. Modem-day materialists, who have no doubt that in principle there can be a purely physical, mechanistic account of even a self-conscious, human mind, may still feel that if Ewert's account is right in outline, toads lack something crucial for consciousness. I would like to draw attention to a confusion that may affect even subtle materialists in their attempts to say what is missing in Ewert's toads. : · :-~-· • ··. · . Ewert does not claim that his model is complete. Note that he attempts to account for only one of the four F's, feeding, alluding only in passing to the interfaces still to be described with the others: fleeing, fighting, and reproduction. What is important is :hat within one quarter of the toad's control agenda, the model claims to show us how the corner is turned at what Ewert calls the "sensorimotor interface": how afferents are eventually "interpreted" to the point.where (normally) appropriate efferents are generated. stm'!~lu~ recognized as prey, n degrees outside the fixation area, :with ac_tivity in 1.'~· meaning .. stimulus moving somewher: m t~e _visual field, yields the command to orient; T5(2'), m_ eanmg stimulus recognized as prey," firing concurrently with Tl(2), meaning "stimulus close to toad," yields the command to fixate, and so forth.
Coi:isider the grounds offered for these renderings of the meanmgs of types of neuronal firing. The particular form of ~ords c~~,sen by Ewert is dictated not by any isolation of syn~actic features of some neuronal "language of thought" as candidates for wo:d~for-word .. translation into English, but rather by an appreciation of the semantic" contribution of those events to the ongoing ~ntrol problem of the toad, expressed (roughly) from t~~ toads narcissistic point of view (Akins 1986).
As Ewe_rt not_e~, prey categorization is approximate" and moreover:.. h1~ dec1~10~ to elevate the semantics of an event type such as Tv (2 ) ~repared to assign to the events. The support he offers for ;,: ~~~~g ~eyond the (J:?re~kean) inf~rmation given when fixing his , ______ en.~gs ot:._m:an~~~-mcludes his recognition of the appropri-
.. --In other words, the "decision-making" relating those messages to those commands does not occur in real time in the toad, but occurred eons ago in the course of the design process that created the wiring diagram that now implements those policies. Their rough wisdom is endorsed, probabilistically, by the very existence of the toad as a surviving descendant, but, it seems, the toad itself has no intelligent contribution to make to its own _ survival. (Here is where the mistaken line of thought begins.) The toad, one gathers, is none the wiser for having messages with these meanings zapping around in its brain. It doesn't appreciate or comprehend or figure out what the observing neuroethologist does. It can get through life reasonably well without benefit of comprehension, thanks to its felicitously arranged inner wiring -and that, it seems, is what makes toads zombies.
It is this line of thought that makes the idea of a language of thought (Fodor 1975) so treacherous. There is a strong temptation to suppose that in a truly intelligent, intentional, conscious creature (unlike the poor toad), the meaning-bearing events streaming in from the sense organs would have to be couched in some parsable, comprehensible language, so that the middletoad (or middleman or self-module) would have some way of recognizing and appreciating their meanings. But this just postpones the problem of meaning, and makes it even more mysterious by setting an impossible task of comprehension and· inference for the inner module (Dennett 1978) . The mistake lie~ in confusing the toad itself (the whole toad, from whose selfcentered perspective all content-ascription must proceed) with some imagined inner middletoad, which, indeed, as a proper part of the toad's nervous system, would be none the wiser for having events coursing through it with various meanings. But the whole toad is the wiser; its capacity to pick its way through its world with some adroitness is explained by the presence of events in its brain having the sort of significance Ewert assigns to them .
This conclusion is hard to accept if one is still enthralled with the common vision of meaning being present in items (in the mind or in the brain) as if it were candy in a box, to be sent from A to B, there to he unpacked and enjoyed (comprehended) by the (intelligent) receiver. The mistake is to concentrate all the intelligence in the imagined middletoad, instead of spreading it through the whole system. This involves offloading inexpressible portions of meaning into the appropriate hard-wiring, and into the acquired interactive effects entrained by experience, in the manner Ewert's model illustrates very well. Once the intelligence is seen as distributed, no inner thing remains to be a candidate for the Mind or Self, but this does not in itself rule out consciousness. ·
The real reason, finally, why we may be inclined to give up on I the toad's inner life is not because when we look closely at the inside, we find nothing but wise wiring -that's all we are ever j going to find in us, too -but because of what we find on theoutside, in the ethology: Toads don't catch on to very_much. If toads were much harder to fool, and learned more, and in particular if they could learn that they were being manipulated, and come to take evasive or counteractive steps of some kind, we would find that our sense that ··somebody was home" would survive. Such cognitive prowess as this would take much more internal machinery than the toad has, but other creatures have _ ..!._· it, and we can know in advance that when we look closely at its _j details (if we can master them at all), we will find no concentra-\ ~~nc;. insight in an inner module, but just much more wise _ 
